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R e g u l at o r y R e f o r m

Would the REINS
Act Rein In
Federal Regulation?
Congress makes another effort to regain control of regulation.
By Jonathan H. Adler | Case Western Reserve University School of Law

O

ver the past several decades, the scope, reach, and
cost of federal regulations have increased dramatically. As the federal regulatory state has grown, legislative control over regulatory policy has declined.
Long after authorizing legislation is adopted, agencies continue
to adopt regulations and implement policies with relatively little
legislative input or oversight. At the same time, presidential
administrations of both parties have used administrative regulations to implement policies and programs that Congress failed to
approve. As legislative control over regulatory policy has waned,
so too has congressional accountability for the regulation.
In the past two years, several members of Congress have
proposed measures to reassert legislative control and enhance
congressional accountability for regulatory policy. The so-called
Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS) Act
would prevent federal agencies from implementing major regulatory initiatives without congressional approval. This legislation
has the support of the House Republican leadership and was
incorporated into the GOP’s 2010 “Pledge to America” as part of
a “plan to rein in the red tape factory in Washington, D.C.”
REINS Act supporters hail the legislation as a needed check
on federal regulatory agencies. Opponents criticize it as a poten-
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tially unconstitutional attack on federal regulations that could
undermine health, safety, and environmental protections. Marketoriented groups and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce believe the act
contains necessary reforms. The Natural Resources Defense Council, on the other hand, calls the REINS Act a “radical” and “perilous” proposal that would hamstring needed regulatory initiatives.
According to the NRDC’s David Goldston, “it is hard to imagine
a more far-reaching, fundamental, and damaging shift in the way
the government goes about its business of safeguarding the public.”
The REINS Act’s most ardent supporters and defenders
assume that the act would stem the flow of federal regulation
from the nation’s capital, but is this so? A more measured look at
the act suggests that it could enhance regulatory accountability
and popular input on major regulatory proposals. Less clear is
whether the legislation would prove to be much of an obstacle
to additional regulatory initiatives or reforms. The REINS Act
would, however, retard the continuing accretion of executive
authority over domestic affairs.

Regulatory Growth
From the 1950s through the 2000s, the amount of federal
regulatory activity, as measured by pages in the Federal Register,
has increased more than six-fold. In the 1950s, federal agencies
published an average of just under 11,000 pages in the Federal
Register per year. By contrast, over the past decade federal agencies averaged over 70,000 pages per year. In 2010, the Federal
Register contained well over 80,000 pages. Over one-quarter of
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those pages were devoted to final agency regulations.
The number of new final rules each year has declined from its
1970s peaks, but federal regulations are still adopted at a rapid
pace. Federal agencies have finalized over 3,500 regulations per
year in each of the last three years. Those rules cover everything
from greenhouse gas emission reporting and proxy disclosures to
electronic fund transfers and the energy and water use of home
appliances. Substantially more regulation is on the way. The 2010
Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions
lists over 4,000 additional regulations in various stages of the regulatory pipeline. By some estimates, the Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (better known as “Dodd-Frank”) will
require over 200 federal rulemakings and the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act will require dozens upon dozens more.
The growth of federal regulation has imposed significant
costs on American business and consumers. According to some
estimates, the aggregate costs of federal regulations could exceed
$1.5 trillion per year — substantially more than the total amount
collected from individual income taxes annually. Regulations
provide benefits as well, and many regulations may provide
greater benefits than costs. But this does not make their costs
irrelevant. Just like taxes, regulations may be necessary to address
public ills or to provide important public benefits, but those
benefits come at a cost nonetheless. The fact that regulations, like
taxes, can both impose substantial costs and generate substantial
benefits makes it that much more important that there be political accountability for federal regulatory decisions.

Delegation
The dramatic increase in the scope of federal regulation has been
facilitated by the practice of delegating substantial amounts of
regulatory authority and policy discretion to federal regulatory
agencies. Federal regulatory agencies have no inherent powers.
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution vests all legislative power
in the Congress. Federal agencies only have the power to adopt
rules governing private conduct if such power has been delegated
to them through a valid statutory enactment.
Over the course of the 20th century, Congress has delegated
ever greater amounts of regulatory authority to an ever-expanding
array of federal agencies. Congress has often had good reasons for
doing this. The economic, environmental, and other problems
Congress sought to address were complicated and often necessitated careful study and analysis. Delegation of regulatory authority
to expert agencies with the time and expertise to focus on specific
problems was a way to ensure that federal regulations were adopted
to address the nuances and particulars of specific problems.
Delegation may have been expedient or even necessary, but
it has also had a cost. The delegation of broad and far-reaching
regulatory authority has undermined political accountability
for regulatory decisions and has allowed for regulatory agencies
to adopt policies that did not always align with congressional
intent or contemporary priorities. When Congress delegates
broad regulatory authority to executive or independent agencies,
24
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it inevitably loses some degree of control over how that authority
is exercised. If a federal agency is instructed to adopt measures
that serve the public interest or control a given environmental
problem as far as is practicable, the federal agency retains substantial discretion to determine what sorts of measures should
be adopted and at what cost.
Judicial review helps ensure that agencies play by the rules set
out by Congress — that agencies provide adequate notice and
opportunity for public participation, provide sufficient explanations for the rules they adopt, observe the limits of their regulatory jurisdiction, and so on. Yet judicial review does not delve into
the policy choices that agencies make — nor should it. Whether a
given agency is following the best course is ultimately a decision
for the political branches.
In principle, the non-delegation doctrine ensures that Congress remains responsible for the major policy judgments that
drive regulatory decisions. In practice, however, the doctrine
does not impose significant constraints on the delegation of
rulemaking power. Under existing precedent, Congress need
only provide federal agencies with an “intelligible principle”
to guide regulatory initiatives. It does not take much to satisfy that standard; any broad statement of policy will do. The
Supreme Court has found an “intelligible principle” in statutes
authorizing federal agencies to set “generally fair and equitable”
prices or to regulate in “the public interest.” As Justice Antonin
Scalia summarized, the Court has “almost never felt qualified
to second-guess Congress regarding the permissible degree of
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying
the law.” As a consequence, federal agencies are left with tremendous amounts of discretion in how they exercise their regulatory
power, including whether to exercise such power at all and even
when, if ever, to change their mind. A statute’s “intelligible principle” need not even dictate a policy direction. Under existing
doctrine, agencies are free to reverse course and overturn prior
policies without any meaningful input from Congress.

Old Statutes, New Regulations
The difficulty of ensuring that agencies remain accountable for
their policy choices is magnified by time. Agencies today continue to exercise authority granted decades ago. To take a current
example, the Environmental Protection Agency is in the midst
of implementing a series of regulations governing the emission
of greenhouse gases from mobile and stationary sources. These
regulations are intended to address an important environmental
concern and will have a tremendous impact on the American
economy as they threaten to affect literally hundreds of thousands of facilities across the nation. The EPA’s authority for these
regulations is a statute passed by Congress, the Clean Air Act,
that the Supreme Court interpreted as authorizing the regulation of greenhouse gases. Yet there is no indication that the current or recently concluded Congresses support the EPA’s actions.
The Clean Air Act’s basic architecture was enacted in 1970. Key
provisions were added in 1977 and 1990, and the act has not been

broad legislative-like authority to administrative agencies while
retaining the unilateral authority to overturn administrative
decisions through legislative action, but without presidential
assent or a veto-proof majority.
A typical legislative veto provision was contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act, which authorized either house of
Congress to invalidate a decision by the U.S. attorney general
to allow an otherwise deportable alien to remain in the United
States. By allowing either house to override an agency decision,
the legislative veto provisions effectively required concurrent
agreement by the president and both houses of Congress before
an agency decision could take effect, for dissent by either the Senate or the House of Representatives was enough to veto the action.
Such provisions were popular, but they were not long-lived.
In 1983, the Supreme Court invalidated unicameral legislative vetoes in Immigration and
Nationalization Service v. Chadha.
The Court held that it was
Though the statutes were passed by Congress,
unconstitutional for a single
and Congress is ultimately responsible for the
house of Congress to overturn
an administrative action taken
power the agencies wield, Congress is not
pursuant
to a valid grant of legparticularly accountable for how agencies today
islative authority. Overturning
exercise power granted years ago.
an administrative action was,
in effect, a legislative act. Under
Article I of the Constitution,
legislative acts require bicameralism and presentment — the
to regulate greenhouse gases were the agency’s and the agency’s
concurrence of both houses of Congress and presentation before
alone. Further, insofar as some maintain that the EPA’s actions
are based upon a misreading of congressional intent, it is dif- the president for his signature or veto, the latter of which could
be overturned by super-majorities in both legislative chambers.
ficult for Congress to correct the agency’s course without going
Since INS v. Chadha, Congress has adopted various reforms
through the lengthy and time-consuming process of amending
aimed at restoring political accountability, disciplining federal
statutes that are on the books. In the meantime, the EPA has
agencies, and ensuring that federal regulatory policy is responsive
taken it upon itself to amend the Clean Air Act’s numerical emission thresholds that trigger stationary source permitting require- to contemporary legislative priorities, all without sacrificing the
practical benefits of delegation. While well-intentioned, these
ments so as to ensure a “common sense” approach to emissions
efforts have been largely unsuccessful.
control that Congress never conceived, let alone adopted.
The most recent effort to impose greater legislative control on
The above is hardly an isolated example. Numerous federal
regulatory policy was the Congressional Review Act of 1996. The
agencies continue to exercise substantial regulatory authority
CRA created an expedited process for consideration of joint resounder old and often outdated statutes. Though the statutes
lutions to overturn regulations of which Congress disapproved.
were passed by Congress, and Congress is ultimately responsible
In effect, the CRA created a framework for Congress to enact new
for the power the agencies wield, Congress is not particularly
laws to overturn or correct administrative implementation of
accountable for how agencies today exercise power granted years
previously enacted laws.
ago. Agency authority, once granted, is difficult to modify or
The CRA created a mechanism whereby Congress could, at
repeal. Drafting and adopting new legislation to revise existing
its own initiative, act to overturn administrative action. Yet the
agency authority is a laborious process not well suited to active
CRA has not been particularly effective — and this should not suragency oversight and control.
prise. There is tremendous inertia within the legislative process,
and if Congress is required to take the initiative to overturn an
Past Efforts at Legislative Control
unjustified or excessive regulation, it is unlikely to happen. Other
priorities compete for legislators’ time and attention, and memIn the mid-20th century, Congress attempted to control
bers of Congress are not always eager to cast a vote for or against
administrative agency decision-making through the adopa controversial or high-profile regulation. As a consequence, the
tion of legislative veto provisions. Between the 1930s and early
CRA has only been used once, to overturn the ergonomics rule
1980s, Congress enacted legislative veto provisions into nearly
adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
300 statutes. These provisions enabled Congress to delegate
amended to any significant degree in over 20 years. According to
the EPA, these decades-olds provisions authorize (if not compel)
it to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from cars and trucks,
utilities, factories, and other sources. According to the EPA, the
legislative grant of authority it received decades ago drives its
decisions today, even though Congress was not at all focused on
global warming when the relevant provisions of the Clean Air Act
were adopted, relatively few members of Congress who voted for
the Clean Air Act remain in Congress today, and Congress has
never taken any action to affirmatively approve such regulation
in the years since the act was adopted or amended.
Although the EPA is exercising authority ostensibly delegated
by Congress, Congress is not politically accountable for the
EPA’s actions. Members of both parties decry the EPA’s policies,
arguing they are too lenient or strict, as if the decision whether
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during the Clinton administration, and it is not widely considered to have disciplined agency action or increased congressional
accountability for regulatory initiatives.
One particular problem is that the CRA effectively requires a
super-majority in Congress to overturn an administrative action.
This is because a president is likely to veto any legislative effort
to overturn a regulation issued by his own administration. As a
consequence, only those rules adopted near the end of a president’s term are vulnerable to CRA repeal, and the executive can
reduce that vulnerability by ensuring new rules are not issued
at the tail end of a presidential term. During the last year of the
Bush administration, for example, agencies were put on notice
that they needed to finalize new regulations early enough so that
they would not be subject to repeal under the CRA.

legislators and special interest groups use to slow or stop legislative proposals. Whereas traditional legislation can be bottled up
in committee or held up by a determined handful of legislators,
resolutions of approval under the REINS Act cannot be disposed
of without a majority vote. This requires an additional step before
new major rules can become effective, but it also requires members of Congress to openly declare their support or opposition
for a specific rule.
While federal agencies promulgate over 3,000 new regulations
each year, only a small percentage of these constitute “major”
rules. From 1998 to 2007, federal agencies promulgated between
50 and 80 major rules per year. By comparison, a new president
will nominate a few hundred people to positions that require Senate confirmation in just the first year of an administration. Most
such nominees go through with minimal delay — and without
obstructing or compromising other legislative business. In the
case of confirmations, Senate rules and traditions provide many
ways for a small minority to gum up the works. A single senator
can place a hold on a controversial or undesirable nominee. No
such means of obstruction are available under the REINS Act,

The REINS Act
The REINS Act seeks to discipline federal regulatory agencies
and enhance congressional accountability for federal regulations without replicating the problems of prior reform efforts
or sacrificing the benefits of
agency expertise and specialization. The legislation’s cenThe REINS Act amends preexisting regulatory
tral provision provides that
new major rules cannot take statutes to remove federal agency authority to
effect unless Congress passes unilaterally adopt regulatory measures,
a joint resolution approving instead requiring agencies to forward “final” rules
the regulation within 90 sesas proposals for congressional review.
sion or legislative days of the
rule’s submission to Congress.
“Major rules” are defined as
however, so there is no way for special interests to secretly stall a
those regulations that are anticipated by the White House
resolution of approval.
Office of Management and Budget to impose annual economic
In effect, the REINS Act amends preexisting regulatory statcosts in excess of $100 million or otherwise have significant ecoutes to remove federal agency authority to unilaterally adopt
nomic or anticompetitive effects. Joint resolutions of approval,
regulatory measures, instead requiring agencies to forward
once passed by both houses of Congress, are then forwarded to
“final” rules as proposals for congressional review. Requiring
the president for his signature (or veto).
congressional approval before economically significant rules may
A key feature of the REINS Act is that it creates an expedited
take effect ensures that Congress takes responsibility for major
procedure to ensure prompt consideration of resolutions of
regulatory policy decisions. Adopting an expedited legislative
approval in each house of Congress. First, it provides that such
process, much like that which has been used for fast-track trade
resolutions are automatically introduced into each house once a
authority or base closings, enhances transparency and prevents a
major rule is finalized by the agency. Second, legislative committees
have a limited time to consider the resolution. Unlike with legisla- congressional review requirement from unduly delaying needed
regulatory initiatives.
tion, the failure of a committee to act does not kill the resolution;
rather, after 15 session days, the resolution is automatically discharged whether the committee has acted or not. Third, the REINS
Criticism | In a recent article in The New Republic critical of the
Act provides that resolutions of approval are privileged, not subject
REINS Act, Univeristy of Richmond law professor Noah Sachs
to amendment, and not subject to dilatory procedural motions.
posed the following hypothetical:
Debate is limited in each house and a resolution may not be filiImagine if the board of a Fortune 500 company required
bustered in the Senate. As introduced in the 112th Congress, the
the company’s vice presidents to obtain board approval before
REINS Act is drafted so as to ensure that a resolution of approval is
implementing any decision. Now imagine that the board is highly
voted up or down in the committee of the whole within 70 session
polarized and its members are at each other’s throats. A recipe for
days of when an agency finalizes a major rule.
corporate gridlock, right?
These provisions effectively disable the traditional means that
If Professor Sachs’ hypothetical were analogous to what the
26
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REINS Act proposes, it would be a devastating critique — but it
is not. Imagine instead if the board of a Fortune 500 company
required the company’s vice presidents to obtain board approval
before implementing the two or three percent of decisions that
are most important and potentially costly. This would not surprise, nor produce “gridlock.” Rather, it is what we would expect
from a responsible board — and it is all that the REINS Act would
do. The approval requirement only applies to “major rules,”
which are those rules expected to cost over $100 million annually and represent less than five percent of the federal regulations
promulgated in any given year. Asking Congress to take responsibility for this portion of federal rulemaking is not unreasonable,
nor is it a major imposition.

Overcoming Chadha
An obvious question for REINS Act supporters is how can
the congressional approval requirement be constitutional if
a unicameral legislative veto, such as that considered in INS v.
Chadha, is not. After all, in either case an agency determination
is effectively vetoed if a majority of either house disapproves.
The legislative veto in Chadha enabled either house to block an
agency ruling by its own initiative. Under the REINS Act, both
houses must vote in the affirmative for a major rule to take
effect. For practical purposes, each requires bicameral consent
for the agency decision to stand. For constitutional purposes,
however, the formal difference is significant.
As then-Judge Stephen Breyer explained in a 1984 lecture, a
congressional authorization requirement could replicate the
function of the legislative veto invalidated in Chadha without the
veto’s constitutional infirmity. By observing the formal requirements for legislation in Article I, he explained, congressional
oversight of agency activity could be maintained without violating constitutional principles of separation of powers. In addition,
unlike the legislative veto, requiring congressional approval for
the adoption of new regulatory initiatives “imposes on Congress
a degree of visible responsibility” for new regulatory initiatives.
Harvard Law School’s Laurence Tribe likewise concluded at the
time that such a requirement would be constitutional, even if he
also thought it would be a bad idea.
The presentment clause in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution provides that, for a bill to become law, it must be passed by a
majority in both the House and Senate and signed into law by the
president or, if vetoed by the president, re-passed by two-thirds
majorities in each house. It further provides that “Every Order,
Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and
House of Representatives may be necessary … shall be presented to
the President of the United States” for his signature or veto. The
REINS Act complies with this requirement. Just like any other bill,
a joint resolution requires the approval of both houses of Congress
and is presented to the president.
In some respects the REINS Act is more limited than the
unicameral legislative vetoes at issue in Chadha or the congressional approval requirement considered by Breyer, as the REINS

Act would only require congressional approval for so-called
“major rules.” The unicameral legislative veto often operated as
a replacement for targeted “private bills” affecting the interests
of a few. By contrast, those regulations subject to the REINS Act
would, by definition, be only those that have broader impacts on
large segments of the country, if not the nation as a whole. Only
those rules deemed to be “economically significant” are covered,
and such rules are a small, but important, portion of federal
regulatory activity.

Restraining Executive Authority?
Some members of Congress, such as Rep. John Conyers (D,
Mich.), have expressed the concern that the REINS Act unduly
interferes with executive authority. Sally Katzen, former director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the
Clinton administration, citing Morrison v. Olson, has argued that
“a statute is suspect if it ‘involves an attempt by Congress to
increase its own powers at the expense of the executive branch.’”
It is reasonable to see the REINS Act as an effort to constrain
the executive — just look at the bill’s full title and findings. The
problem with these arguments is that they ignore the distinction
between executive and legislative functions.
The power to “enforce” the laws — that is, the power to take
action to see that legal rules are complied with — is distinct from
the power to make the rules pursuant to a delegation of authority from Congress. So, for instance, the EPA’s power to impose
fines or other sanctions on companies that violate emission
limitations is distinct from the EPA’s power to set the emission
limits. A requirement that federal regulatory agencies obtain congressional approval before major rules may take effect requires
congressional assent for the latter, but has no effect on the former.
The powers to investigate and prosecute are core executive functions. Any effort by Congress to limit such powers and aggrandize
its own is problematic. This point was made not only in Morrison
(in which the Court upheld the statute in question, despite its
intrusion on executive power), but in other cases as well. The executive power is distinct from the power to adopt legislative-type rules,
however. The latter is not a core executive function. Rather it is
a quasi-legislative power that must be delegated by Congress. As
the Supreme Court has noted repeatedly, “It is axiomatic that an
administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative regulation
is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”
Federal agencies have no authority to promulgate regulations beyond that which has been given by Congress — and what
Congress has given, it may take back. Restraining the exercise
of such authority, whether by adopting rules for the exercise of
regulatory authority (as under the Administrative Procedure Act
or the Congressional Review Act) or limiting the scope of such
authority, is perfectly acceptable so long as other constitutional
requirements (such as bicameralism and presentment) are satisfied. As the REINS Act satisfies such requirements, there is no
problem. The REINS Act does not curtail executive power so
much as it places limits on the legislative-like power delegated to
Summer 2011
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the executive branch by Congress. While the REINS Act would
reduce the discretion of executive and independent agencies to
adopt far-reaching regulatory measures, it would not interfere
with executive oversight of rulemaking and regulatory policy.
A more serious constitutional question about the REINS Act is
whether a statute may impose binding legislative process rules on
either house of Congress. Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution
provides that “Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings.” According to some scholars, this means that each house has
exclusive, unilateral control over its own rules, and that it would
be unconstitutional to preempt such authority with a statute
subject to presentment to the executive. If so, this would mean
that a subsequent House or Senate could unilaterally repeal the
procedural rules the REINS Act creates for expedited consideration
of resolutions of approval. Yet such concerns have not stopped
Congress from enacting numerous other statutes creating special
procedural rules for special types of legislation, including fast-track
trade authority and base closing decisions, and Congress appears
to have stuck to the terms of such deals. There is a well-established
practice of legislative compliance with statutorily enacted rules.

Toward Greater Congressional Accountability
The REINS Act provides a means of curbing excessive or unwarranted regulation, but it is not an obstacle to needed regulatory
measures supported by the public. If agencies are generally
discharging their obligations in a sensible manner, REINS Act–
type controls will have little effect. Indeed, even if federal regulatory agencies are overzealous, the REINS Act may not curtail
federal regulation all that much. The legislation would apply
only to new major rules, so existing regulations would remain
untouched, and it would constrain regulatory and deregulatory
initiatives alike. Perhaps more significantly, it is not clear that
members of Congress would be so quick to condemn regulatory proposals once they know they will be required to back up
their criticisms with an on-the-record vote.
It is easy to claim the EPA has adopted an overly expensive rule,
but may be more difficult to vote against pollution controls if it
means a legislator has to take responsibility for a lack of federal
action. As New York University law professor David Schoenbrod
has argued, administrative delegation has often resulted in less
environmental protection than there would have been had
Congress been required to take responsibility for federal policy.
Based on his experience as a litigator for the NRDC, Schoenbrod
believes lead would have been phased out of gasoline much earlier were it not for Congress’s ability to punt. Corporate interests
have far more influence on agency rulemakings than open votes
on the floor, largely because the former are far more insulated
from public view.
Some REINS Act critics argue the reform is unnecessary
because federal regulatory agencies are already subject to sufficient oversight. Federal agencies are not out of control as demonstrated by studies that conclude that the benefits of federal
regulations outweigh their costs. This may be so, but it is irrel28
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evant. That a government analysis concludes that a given rule is
net beneficial does not by itself mean that the rule is good policy.
Regulations commandeer private resources, forcing them to be
allocated to one purpose or another. Sometimes this is necessary
or wise, but a simple cost-benefit analysis alone does not demonstrate this fact, nor can such studies show that one regulatory
approach is superior to available alternatives. We cannot afford
every net-beneficial idea anymore than the federal government
or a private firm can afford to make every investment that is
expected to yield a positive return. Moreover, cost-benefit analyses
are notoriously manipulable and imprecise, as progressives like
to remind us, and they cannot account for normative concerns.
If the public believes that more regulations are necessary or
supports regulatory initiatives of a particular type, requiring a
resolution of congressional approval will not stand in the way.
Indeed, it would enhance the legitimacy of those regulations
Congress approves by making clear that such initiatives command the support of both the legislative and executive branches.
If environmental regulation is as popular as environmentalist
groups claim, then there is really nothing to fear from the REINS
Act. Even if the legislation allows conservatives in Congress to
vote down some new major rules — a plausible scenario now
that Republicans control the House of Representatives — antiregulatory members of Congress will suffer for opposing the
regulatory protections Americans want. The REINS Act forces
major regulatory decisions onto the floor of Congress and into
the open, which provides greater popular accountability than
backroom deal-making or the administrative rulemaking process.
Above all else, the REINS Act provides a means of enhancing
political accountability for regulatory policy.

Conclusion
Federal regulation reaches nearly all aspects of modern life and
is pervasive in the modern economy. Much of this regulation
may be necessary or advisable, and nothing in the REINS Act
would hinder a sympathetic Congress from approving new
federal regulations. In all likelihood, however, the REINS Act’s
congressional approval process would prevent the implementation of particularly unpopular or controversial regulatory
initiatives. The primary effect of the legislation would be to
make Congress more responsible for federal regulatory activity
by forcing legislators to voice their opinion on the desirability
of significant regulatory changes.
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